3. The Transboundary Dilemma: Part 2
In this follow-up post, I plan to explore various factors at the national scale that motivate each riparian states' approach to transboundary governance- focusing on Mali and Nigeria as case studies. I intend to move away from the focus on transboundary aquifers to include all transboundary water resources in order to illustrate a more holistic depiction of water, politics, and governance in the Sahel. I aim to highlight the conditions in Mali and Nigeria where transboundary governance is difficult and hinders the effective managing of water resources.
It is well understood that transboundary water governance is challenging yet essential due to the physical interdependency between the riparian countries. Activities in one state have actual and potential implications for another (Scheumann and Herrfahrdt-Pahle, 2008). This is especially true in the case of dam development in the Niger River Basin. The Sélingué Dam built in 1982, located along a tributary of the Niger River in Mali, has been attributed to negative side effects faced by communities downstream. Decreased water quality from siltation is being exacerbated by the dam's presence, trapping and concentrating nearly a quarter of all sediment in the drainage basin (Ferry et al., 2011). The dam has also been thought to retain water from downstream communities in Niger and Nigeria during low-rainfall drought seasons, instead irrigating the inland delta in Mali. Despite this, the Malian government continues to pursue its plans to construct a large-scale irrigation system and the Fomi dam along the country's Inner Niger Delta.
Against a backdrop of conflict, poverty, and population growth, Mali depends on building such infrastructure in order to sustain its people. Amidst battling water shortages in both urban and rural areas, the Malian government struggles under climate change to ensure food security and manage conflict between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers. On top of it all, Mali is required to provide ample water to Niger and Nigeria downstream. The Fomi Dam is a key solution to all these issues for Mali. The 102 megawatt dam is meant to ensure year-round irrigation by withholding flows during the rainy season and timing releases during the year. The Selingue Dam in Mali is similar and diverts a lot of water to irrigation along the driest areas in Mali and all along the inner delta region. However, the effect of these dams are felt strongly by the rest of the Niger Delta downstream. The dams reduce water flow into the delta, upsetting the rich ecosystem of the wetlands which in turn effects 2 million people who depend on its fisheries, agriculture, and pasturelands the delta supports (EJAtlas, 2016). This is why Mali has much less reason to cooperate in regional water governance, as it does not have the economic and political will to compromise its dams (which have been contested by Niger) in order to support its people.
Nigeria on the other hand faces a different set of circumstances that influence its approach to water governance. Geopolitically, Nigeria has no near equivalent in the Sahel due to its population, economic, and military size. As a result, its unmatched power makes Nigeria a hydrohegemon– able to act unilaterally and impose its views on water governance across the Sahel. Revisiting the case study of the Lake Chad Basin, Nigeria has a strong financial and political grip over the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Though Nigeria only makes up 7% of the total land cover of the basin, it makes up 52% of the LCBC's operational budget (Galeazzi et al., 2017). With nine of the LCBC's Executive Secretaries coming from Nigeria, it has the opportunity to advance projects that it gains from most. An example being the proposed interbasin transfer from the Ubangui river. Nigeria proposed and strongly backs the Congo River Interbasin Water Transfer project- an expansion and recharging of water in Lake Chad to its historical boundaries as Northern Nigeria regains access to the body’s shores, which would mean a return of fisheries and agricultural self-sufficiency to the war-torn north (Galeazzi et al., 2017). This case study reminds us that water governance at its core is all about power relationships and can be conceptualized as the “exercise of authority” of water-related actions (Kuzdas and Wiek, 2014). Under the rhetoric of reviving the lake basin from the ‘brink of extinction’, Nigeria claims that the project is a necessary solution to help community livelihoods address water scarcity and climate change (Higgins, 2020). This is true though heavily exaggerated and the project has been met with criticism from riparians of the Ubangi and Congo rivers (namely the CAR and the DRC) over its potential reduce energy production of the Inga dam and hinder fisheries.
It is for these reasons that transboundary governance is difficult as hydrohegemons like Nigeria can use governing bodies like the LCBC to their direct benefit. In Mali’s case, upstream riparians who are already extremely resource limited and under heavy water stress have little incentive to cooperate to ensure water for downstream communities. The water crisis in the Sahel is less of a problem of scarcity, but a problem of governance and requires multi-level participation and engagement and until this is recognized and acted upon, water scarcity will continue to persist (Perreault, 2014) (Dinar et al., 2015)
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